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The hedonistic theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are both widely 
known. Hedonism before Bentham, however, is much less known and, hitherto, no 
systematic  presentation  of  hedonism’s  early  history  has  been  written.  In  this 
paper I seek to fill this gap in the literature by providing an overview of hedonism 
in early Indian and ancient Greek thought (Sections 1-4), in Roman and Medieval 
thought (Section 5), and from the Renaissance until the Enlightenment (Section 6). 
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1.  Early Indian and Greek Hedonism 
Where does the history of hedonism begin? The answer hinges, naturally, on how 
we define ‘hedonism’. If we use the term in its popular sense, to mean a way of 
life where one seeks to promote pleasure and avoid pain, hedonism is no doubt 
very  old,  for  pleasures  and  pains  attract  and  repel  us  irrespective  of  our 
philosophical views. If we require something more, however, like philosophical 
reflection about value and disvalue—and the idea that pleasure and pain are the 
end points in such matters—the oldest example of hedonism is arguably Cārvāka, 
a  materialist,  empiricist,  and  hedonistic  intellectual  tradition  in  early  Indian 
philosophy (5
th–6
th Centuries BC) from which we now only have fragments. Some 
of these fragments are poetical: 
 
While life is yours, live joyously 
  None can escape Death's searching eye 
  When once this frame of ours they burn 
How shall it ever again return?
1 
 
Other fragments are more practical:  
 
By doing only what is considered practical, such as farming, 
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attending to cattle, trading, and doing political and administrative 
work, a wise man should always strive to achieve pleasure in this 
world.
2 
 
In addition to the extant fragments, Cārvāka is discussed in the Vedas and the 
Upanishads.  There  its  adherents  are  scorned  for  being  nāstika  (heretics):  for 
challenging  gods  and  established  customs,  and  for  giving  in  to  this-worldly 
pleasures.
3 
While hedonism was an undercurrent in early Indian thought, it became 
part of the mainstream in ancient Greece. The first hedonist among the Pre -
Socratics was Democritus, and though we have only fragments from him left, 
several of these are explicitly hedonistic: ‘The best thing for a man,’ Democritus 
writes, ‘will be to live his life with as much joy as possible and as little grief,’ for 
‘joy and sorrow are the distinguishing marks of things beneficial and harmful.’ 
Another fragment attributes to him that ‘what makes life really worthwhile is not 
one's possessions of any externals, but one’s state of mind’ and that only ‘fools 
live without enjoying life.’
4 
The first hedonist whose arguments we know is Aristippus of Cyrene, and 
though all of Aristippus’ original writings have been lost, he is extensively quoted 
and  discussed  in  Diogenes  Laërtius’  Lives  of  Eminent  Philosophers  and 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia. According to Diogenes, Aristippus said the following 
about the relationship between pleasure (hēdonē) and happiness (eudaimonía): 
 
Particular  pleasure  is  desirable  for  its  own  sake,  whereas 
happiness is desirable not for its own sake, but for the sake of 
particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact 
that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, 
when we obtain it, seek nothing more, and shun nothing so much 
as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the 
most unseemly conduct … For even if the action be irregular, 
still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own 
sake and is good.
5 
 
Aristippus was controversial, and Diogenes explains that he was accused of 
defending a form of  Sybaritic hedonism – a hedonism that places value only on 
the pleasures of the moment without any regard for the future. Sybaritic hedonism 
derived its name from the city-state of Sybaris, where the inhabitants, according 
to Herodotus, caroused their way into their own demise. 
                                                        
2 Ibid. 
3 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 2005, p. 24.  
4 J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, Cleardon Press, Oxford, 1982, p. 
27–37. See H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6. ed, Weidmann, Berlin, 
1951, 68 A 1, §§45, 170, 188, 189, 200. 
5 Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 
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Some antique texts can be interpreted in ways that support the accusation 
that  Aristippus  was  indeed  a  Sybaritic  hedonist.  According  to  Atheneaus’ 
Deipnosophistae,  Aristippus  claimed  that  ‘past  and  future  enjoyment  had  no 
relevance to himself, because the first no longer had being, the second had no 
being as yet, and was uncertain.’
6 Claudius Aelianus, in Varia Historia, writes 
that Aristippus told people ‘to pay attention to each day as it comes, and similarly 
to that part of the day in which the individual’s action or thought takes place. For 
he said that only the present is ours.’
7 Accordingly, some interpret Aristippus as 
holding a very radical position: that we should be indifferent to the future and live 
only for the present. To make the case for such an interpretation, Terence Irwin 
argues that Aristippus was most likely skeptical of the idea of a lasting self.
8 It is 
also possible to interpret Aristippus in a less radical manner, however, as holding 
that  although  pleasures  have  value  only  in  the  moments  when  they  are 
experienced, we still have reason to be concerned with sec uring future pleasures 
and avoiding future pains. Support for such an interpretation is given claims by 
Aristippus such as ‘the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often 
of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure’
9—which indicates that he took a 
diachronic perspective—and by a point he makes in the Atheneaus quote above, 
namely that future pleasures are ‘uncertain.’ If the future were irrelevant anyway, 
why would our level of certainty be of interest? 
Aristippus was an esteemed philosopher in late 5
th Century Athens, and in 
Lives  of  Eminent  Philosophers,  Diogenes  Laërtius  gives  him  as  elaborate  a 
treatment as he gives Aristotle. Speusippus, who led the Academy after Plato’s 
death, wrote a now lost dialogue titled Aristippus, and in the Phaedo (59c) Plato 
finds it worth noting that Aristippus was not present during the discussion.
10 
Aristippus  founded  a  hedonistic  school,  the  Cyrenaic  school,  which 
continued to exist for three generations after its founder. Its thinkers departed 
from some of Aristippus’ ideas, but they all remained hedonists. Theodorus, who 
had been Aristippus’ disciple, claimed, according to  Diogenes,  that Aristippus 
was right when ‘he considered joy and grief to be the supreme good and evil,’ but 
that he failed to see that the world is too brutal and unfriendly for pleasure to be 
achievable.
11 Diogenes says of Theodorus that ‘[f]riendship he rejected because it 
did not exist between the unwise nor between the wise; with the former, when the 
want is removed, the friendship disappears, whereas the wise are self-sufficient, 
and  have  no  need  of  friends.’
12  Theodorus  purportedly  claimed  that  ‘theft, 
adultery, and sacrilege would be allowable upon occasion, since none of these 
acts is by nature base, if once you have removed prejudice against them,’ and that 
we should not be ashamed of indulging our passions openly, for the beautiful 
                                                        
6 Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass.,1927, XII, 544–588. 
7 Claudius Aelian, Historical Miscellany, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass.,1997, 14.6. 
8 Terence Irwin, ‘Aristippus Against Happiness’, The Monist, Vol. 74, No. 1., 1991, p. 62–6. 
9 Diogenes Laërtius, II. 90. 
10 Aristippus, we are told, was in Aegina. Diogenes Laërtius, II.65, II.72., II.5. 
11 Ibid. II.98. 
12 Ibid. UCL Bentham Project 
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exists to be enjoyed, and ‘he who uses anything for the purpose for which it is 
useful does no wrong.’
13 
Hegesias, who was also a Cyrenaic, advocated a hedonism that was less 
Sybaritic, but no less as dark-minded, than Theodorus’. According to Hegesias 
pleasure is the sole ultimate good, but it cannot be achieved, for  ‘the body is 
infected with much suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body 
and is a prey to disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows 
that happiness cannot be realized.’ The best we can achieve is living free of pain. 
If  this  is  the  best,  Hegesias  admitted,  it  follows  that  ‘life  and  death  are  each 
desirable in turn.’
14 According to Cicero, Hegesias’s book Death by Starvation led 
to a wave of suicides and was therefore banned by king Ptolemy II Philadelphus.
15 
The Cyrenaic school died with Hegesias. 
 
 
2.  Plato 
Plato was of the same generation as Aristippus, and in several of his dialogues, he 
discusses  hedonism  in  detail.  In  the  dialogue  Protagoras,  Socrates  says  the 
following: 
 
[Y]ou put the pleasures together and the pains together, both the 
near and the remote, on the balance scale, and then say which of 
the two is more. For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, 
the greater and the more must always be taken; if painful things 
against  painful,  the  fewer  and  the  smaller.  And  if  you  weigh 
pleasant things against painful, and the painful is exceeded by the 
pleasant—whether the near by the remote or the remote by the 
near—you  have  to  perform  that  action  in  which  the  pleasant 
prevails;  on the other hand, if the pleasant  is  exceeded by the 
painful, you have to refrain from doing that.
16 
 
J. B. C. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor interpret Socrates as advancing a purely 
hedonistic thesis: that pleasure is the sole ultimate value and pain is the sole 
ultimate disvalue, and that these are all that matter in practical deliberation.
17 This 
might seem like a   plausible interpretation, but it is also possible to interpret 
Socrates less hedonistically, as discussing how we should deliberate when only 
the pleasure and pain variables are taken into account. If this is the correct 
interpretation, Socrates needs not defend hedonism, but might defend a pluralistic 
theory.  Support  for  this  interpretation  can  be  found  in  formulations  where 
                                                        
13 Ibid. II.99–100. 
14 Ibid. II.94. 
15 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1888, I.34. 
16 Plato, Protagoras, trans. by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell. In Plato: Collected Works, John 
M. Cooper (ed.), Hackett, Indianapolis, Ind./Cambridge, Mass., 1997, 356a-c. 
17 Gosling and Taylor, p. 50. UCL Bentham Project 
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Socrates speaks of pleasure as ‘a good’ rather than ‘the good’ (e.g. 315e). 
In the later dialogue Gorgias Socrates is decidedly less favorable in his 
treatment of hedonism.  Socrates asks Callicles,  his interlocutor, the following: 
‘Tell me now too whether you say that the pleasant and the good are the same or 
whether there is some pleasure that isn’t good.’ Callicles answers: ‘I say they’re 
the same.’
18 Socrates says that he disagrees, claims that shameful things follow 
from Callicles’ thesis (495b), and proceeds to present a line of arguments against 
hedonism. 
Socrates first makes Callicles agree with him that nothing can be good and 
bad at the same time. Thereafter, Socrates points out that when we drink, we are 
pained (because we are thirsty) and at the same time we are pleased (because we 
drink). Accordingly, drinking can be pleasurable and painful at the same time. But 
if something can be pleasurable and painful at the same time, yet nothing can be 
good and bad at the same time, then the good cannot be identical with pleasure 
and the bad cannot be identical with pain (496a-497d). Second, Socrates argues 
that even though courage is good and cowardice is bad, a courageous man may 
suffer  and  a  cowardly  man  may  enjoy—and  here  again,  he  claims,  hedonists 
would  be  forced  to  say  that  he  is  good  and  bad  at  the  same  time,  which  is 
impossible (497e-499b). Socrates also argues that certain pains can be beneficial 
and certain pleasures can be harmful, and that the medical craft is better than the 
craft of pastry baking even though pastry baking is the greater source of pleasure. 
Finally, Socrates argues that tragedies can be good even if they are painful and 
that orators can be bad even if they make their audience feel good (499d-500d). 
After Socrates’ tirade Callicles admits that he does not know how to respond. 
Gosling and Taylor suggest that Socrates, in Gorgias, can be interpreted as 
arguing against only a shortsighted, Sybaritic hedonism, not against hedonism as 
such. This interpretation has some plausibility, as most of what Socrates claims 
can  be  conceded  by  more  sophisticated  hedonists  than  Callicles.  Such  an 
interpretation would also contribute to bringing Protagoras and Gorgias into less 
conflict, granted that Gosling and Taylor are right that Socrates defends hedonism 
in Protagoras. Gosling and Taylor’s is a controversial interpretation, however, 
and at one point, Socrates explicitly says that he does not identify the good with 
pleasure (495d-e). Admittedly, it is possible to claim that this is also compatible 
with hedonism, for goodness can be different from pleasure but still attached to 
pleasure and pleasure only, but it is doubtful if Socrates would have formulated 
his view the way he does if he were in fact defending hedonism. 
Irrespective of how we interpret Protagoras and Gorgias, Socrates argues 
explicitly against hedonism in the Philebus. Here Philebus and Protarchus defend 
hedonism, and Socrates starts out by summarizing their view in contrast to his 
own: 
 
                                                        
18 Plato, Gorgias, trans. by Donald J. Zeyl. In Plato: Collected Works, John M. Cooper (ed.), 
Hackett, Indianapolis, Ind./Cambridge, Mass., 1997, 495a. UCL Bentham Project 
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Philebus  holds  that  what  is  good  for  all  creatures  is  to  enjoy 
themselves, to be pleased and delighted, and whatever else goes 
together with that kind of thing. We contend that not these, but 
knowing,  understanding,  and  remembering,  and  what  belongs 
with  them,  right  opinion  and  true  calculations,  are  better  than 
pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them.
19 
 
In addition to arguing  for the value of things other than pleasu re, Socrates 
advances  two  new  arguments  against  hedonism.  His  first  argument  is  that 
pleasures share no unifying characteristic: 
 
If one just goes by the name, then pleasure is one single thing, but 
in fact it comes in many forms that are quite unlike each  other. 
Think about it: we say that a mad man gets pleasure, and also that 
a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again, 
we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets 
pleasure, but likewise a wise man takes pleasur e in his wisdom. 
But surely anyone who said in either case that these pleasures are 
like one another would rightly be regarded as a fool (11b-c).
 
 
 
If there is nothing that unites all pleasures, it is unclear how hedonists can claim 
that  pleasure,  and  pleasure  only,  is  the  good.  Socrates  further  argues  that  if 
hedonism is correct, we should prefer to be an oyster rather than a human being 
given  that  the  oyster’s  life  is  just  slightly  more  pleasant  –  and  this,  Socrates 
claims, is obviously wrong (21a-d). 
Even though Socrates (or at least the late Socrates) was not a hedonist, he 
does claim, in the Republic, that the best of all lives—the philosopher’s life—is 
also the most pleasant life.
20 In fact, a philosopher’s life is 729 times (!) more 
pleasurable than the life of an unjust tyrant (587e). Still, it is not solely by virtue 
of being the most pleasant life that the philosopher’s life is the best; in Socrates’ 
view, the explanation also goes the other way: It is in part by virtue of being the 
best life that a philosopher’s life is the most pleasant. 
 
 
3.  Aristotle 
Aristotle discusses hedonism at length in the Nicomachean Ethics. Early in Book 
VII  he  claims  that  the  arguments  that  philosophers  have  advanced  against 
hedonism so far have all failed to disprove the theory. Thereafter he argues that 
pleasures are ends in themselves (1153a10) and necessary parts of a good life 
                                                        
19 Plato, Philebus, trans. by Dorothea Frede. In Plato: Collected Works, John M. Cooper (ed.), 
Hackett, Indianapolis, Ind./Cambridge, Mass., 1997, 11b-c. 
20 Plato, Republic, trans. by G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve. In Plato: Collected Works, John M. 
Cooper (ed.), Hackett, Indianapolis, Ind./Cambridge, Mass., 1997, 581e-583a. UCL Bentham Project 
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(1153b18), that bodily pleasures are also good (1145a10-14), and that pleasures 
that do not bring with them any pains are things of which one cannot get too much 
(1154b16-17).  None  of  this  needs  imply  an  endorsement  of  hedonism,  but  as 
Roslyn  Weiss  points  out,  Aristotle  ‘comes  dangerously  close  to  committing 
himself to the position that pleasure is indeed the supreme good.’
21 
In Book X, however, Aristotle argues against hedonism, and he criticises 
the arguments for hedonism put forth by Eudoxus of Cnidus. Aristotle, who is our 
primary source for Eudoxus’ ethics, tells us that Eudoxus held that pleasure is the 
good (1172b9), and goes on to discuss four arguments that Eudoxus supposedly 
presented in defense of his view. Eudoxus’ first argument, according to Aristotle, 
is that  
 
all [animals], both rational and nonrational, seek it [pleasure], and 
in everything, he [Eudoxus] says, what is choice worthy is good, 
and what is most choiceworthy is supreme. The fact that all are 
drawn to the same thing [i.e pleasure], indicates, in his view, that 
it is best for all, since each [kind of animal] finds its own good, 
just as it finds its own nourishment; and what is good for all, what 
all aim at, is the good. (1172b, 10-17)  
 
In Aristotle’s context, this is a weighty argument. Earlier in Book VII Aristotle 
has  conceded  that  ‘[t]he  fact  that  all,  both  beasts  and  human  beings,  pursue 
pleasure is some sign of its being in some way the best good’ (1153b25-26), and 
famously, the Nicomachean Ethics opens with the statement that ‘[e]very craft 
and every line of inquiry, and likewise every action and decision, seems to seek 
some good; that is why some people were right to describe the good as what 
everything seeks’ (1094a1-4). It is interesting to note, moreover, that Aristotle 
does not offer a counterargument against Eudoxus. Rather than arguing, Aristotle 
writes that ‘These arguments of his were found credible because of his virtuous 
character, rather than on their own [merit]’ (1172b16-19). Flattering as this might 
be,  it  is  an  ad  hominem,  and  Aristotle  fails  to  explain  what  is  wrong  with 
Eudoxus’ first argument. 
Eudoxus’ second argument is an inversion of the first. Eudoxus, Aristotle 
explains, claims that pain is that which everyone seeks to avoid, and since pain is 
the opposite of pleasure, this supports the theory that pleasure is that towards 
which  everyone  strives.  This  is  also  something  that  Aristotle  earlier  has 
conceded—‘the contrary to that which is to be avoided, insofar as it is bad and to 
be avoided, is a good’ (1153b3-4)—and again Aristotle does not explain what is 
wrong with Eudoxus’ argument. 
Eudoxus’  third  argument  is  that  ‘when  pleasure  is  added  to  any  other 
good, to just or temperate action, for instance, it makes that good more choice 
                                                        
21 Roslyn Weiss, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Eudoxian Hedonism’, Classical Philology, Vol. 74, No. 
3, 1979, p. 214. UCL Bentham Project 
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worthy’  (1172b24-26).  Accordingly,  pleasure  must  be  good.  Here  Aristotle 
agrees, but he points out that this does not show that pleasure is the sole good, as 
hedonists  suggest,  for  the  argument  is  compatible  with  pleasure  being  one  of 
several  goods.  Aristotle  also  points  out  that  a  similar  argument  can  be  used 
against  Eudoxus’  own  view,  for  we  can  imagine  that  everything—pleasure 
included—can be made better if, in addition to it, we have another good, such as 
justice or wisdom. If this is so, then hedonism must be false, for ‘nothing can be 
added  to  the  good  to  make  it  more  choice  worthy’  (1172b33-34).  This  is 
Aristotle’s first substantial argument against Eudoxus. 
Aristotle further argues that there are pleasures that we should not seek. 
He  claims  that  ‘pleasures  are  choice  worthy,  but  not  if  they  come  from 
[disgraceful] sources, just as wealth is desirable, but not if you have to betray 
someone to get it, and health is desirable, but not if it requires you to eat anything 
and everything’ (1173b25-27). Here Aristotle appeals to the common sense view 
that there are bad pleasures, and he claims that hedonism must contradict common 
sense in this respect. Finally Aristotle writes the following: 
 
And no one would choose to live with a child's [level of] thought 
for his whole life, taking as much pleasure as possible in what 
pleases  children, or to  enjoy himself  while doing some utterly 
shameful  action,  even  if  he  would  never  suffer  pain  for  it. 
Moreover, there are many things that we would be eager for even 
if they brought no pleasure, e.g. seeing, remembering, knowing, 
having  the  virtues.  Even  if  pleasures  necessarily  follow  from 
them, that does not matter, since we would choose them even if 
no pleasure resulted from them. It would seem clear, then, that 
pleasure is not the good ... (1174a1-10) 
 
Even though it becomes clear that Aristotle rejects hedonism in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, it is unclear if the work achieved its full purpose: The work is written to 
Aristotle’s son, but in spite of his father’s attacks on hedonism, Diogenes Laërtius 
reports that ‘Nicomachus, Aristotle’s son, has said that he declares pleasure to be 
the good.’
22 
 
 
4.  Epicurus 
Epicurus  is  the  most  central  ancient  hedonist,  and  according  to  Eusebius  and 
Diogenes,  Epicurus  derived  many  of  his  ideas  from  Democritus,  Aristippus, 
Theodorus,  and  Eudoxus.
23  There  are,  however,  several  aspects  of  Epicurus’ 
hedonism  that  make  it  original.  First,  Epicurus  thought  that  ultimately,  no 
argument is necessary to establish that pleasure is good. If we seek to argue for 
                                                        
22 Diogenes Laërtius, VIII.87-88.  
23 Ibid., II.97, X. UCL Bentham Project 
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the value of pleasure by pointing, for example, to the fact that everyone strives to 
achieve it, we are weakening our case, for then we argue for something obvious 
by means  of something less obvious. According to  Epicurus—this  is  Cicero’s 
interpretation in De Finibus—we experience the goodness of pleasure and the 
badness of pain as directly as we experience the warmth of fire and the sweetness 
of honey.
24 Gosling and Taylor write that Epicurus thought that ‘the experience of 
pleasure is experience of its goodness,’ and that ‘every perception involves being 
affected  in  one  or  other  of  these  ways  [i.e.  pleasure  or  pain]  and  in  such 
perception a sentient being grasps the value or disvalue of being so affected.’
25 
Epicurus is sometimes dubbed a negative hedonist. A negative hedonist is 
one who, in some respect, holds that it is more important to avoid pain than to 
attain  pleasure.  Epicurus  writes  in  Principal  Doctrines  that  ‘The  amount  of 
pleasure reaches its limit when all pain is removed. When pleasure is present, as 
long as it remains undisturbed, there is pain neither in body nor in mind.’
26 One 
possible interpretation of this is that Epicurus takes pleasure to be identical with 
the absence of pain. This seems puzzling, however, for a person who does not feel 
anything is clearly in another mental state than a person who feels pleasure. It is 
possible,  however,  to  interpret  Epicurus  differently.  On  one  interpretation, 
Epicurus  claims  that  human  psychology  is  such  that  the  absence  of  pain  is 
positively pleasurable. Another (and compatible) interpretation is that our primary 
aim in life should be to free ourselves from pains, for if we engage in strongly 
pleasurable activities, we will end up being pained by the negative consequences 
of our pursuit. We find support for such an interpretation in Epicurus’ Letter to 
Menoeceus: 
 
For it is not drinking bouts and continuous playing and enjoying 
boys and women, or consuming fish and the other dainties of an 
extravagant  table,  which  produce  the  pleasant  life,  but  sober 
calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and 
avoidance and drives out the opinions which are the source of the 
greatest turmoil for men's souls.
27  
 
According to Epicurus the best life is a plain and simple one where one’s well-
being is not dependent on extravagant material goods: 
 
Becoming accustomed to simple, not  extravagant,  ways  of life 
makes one completely healthy, makes man unhesitant in the face 
of life’s necessary duties, puts us in a better condition for times of 
extravagance  which  occasionally  come  along,  and  makes  us 
                                                        
24 Cicero, On Ends, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass, 1914, I.IX.30. 
25 Gosling and Taylor, p. 347. 
26 Diogenes Laërtius, X.139. 
27 Ibid., 10.132 UCL Bentham Project 
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fearless in the face of chance.
28 
 
Epicurus thus seems to deny neither that pleasures really exist nor that they are 
good; he claims, more modestly, that to get the best life possible, what we need is 
the right attitude. If we have the right  attitude, we can, even if we are poor, live 
more pleasant and less painful lives than wealthy emperors. If we lack it, all the 
power and wealth in the world cannot help us. 
Being a full-fledged hedonist, Epicurus holds that the proper aim of every 
human  undertaking,  philosophical  inquiry  included,  is  to  avoid  pain  and,  if 
possible, to secure pleasure. Although  philosophical inquiry can hardly free us 
from bodily pains, other than by reminding us that they will only be temporary, it 
can, in Epicurus’ view, free us from pains that originate in the mind. Philosophy 
can help us remove fears, and the fear that Epicurus takes to pain people the 
most—the fear of death—is a fear that, in Epicurus’ view, can be demonstrated by 
philosophy to be groundless. First, Epicurus claims that if we take hedonism to be 
true, then everything good and everything bad lies in sensation, and death is the 
end of sensation. Death, therefore, can be neither good nor bad, and that which is 
neither good nor bad cannot possibly be bad. If something is not bad, moreover, 
we have no reason to fear it. Second, Epicurus argues that we are always outside 
the reach of death. The reason why is that as long as we are present, death does 
not exist in our lives, and when death is present, we are no longer here to suffer 
from it. Death, therefore, can never reach us, and we have no reason to fear that 
which can never reach us.
29 Fear of death, which pains many people so much, can 
thus be removed by philosophical  inquiry. Philosophy can help us live tranquil, 
fearless lives. 
 
 
5.  Roman and Medieval Hedonism 
Epicurus’  influence  is  vast,  and  a  large  number  of  Epicurean  societies  were 
founded throughout the Ancient world. Here adherents of Epicurus’ philosophy 
gathered to live peaceful and contemplative lives, as Epicurus himself sought to 
do  in  his  garden  in  Athens.  Amafinius,  Philodemus,  Colotes,  Hermarchus, 
Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Zeno of Sidon were all Epicurean hedonists, and 
the devout follower Diogenes of Oenoanda made a stone inscription of Epicurus’ 
works—amounting to  over 25,000 words—in  the city of Oenoanda in  today’s 
Libya. Through such popularization, Epicurus’ ideas reached a wide audience. 
Epicurus did, however, also have a strong influence on other philosophers. 
Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura is a poetic defense of Epicurus’ philosophy, and 
Lucretius—acknowledging his admiration for Epicurus—wrote on the topic of his 
master’s death that ‘even Epicurus passed when his life’s way came to an end, he 
who with his genius far exceeded everyone else, just as the sun darkens the stars 
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when it enters.’
30 In addition to defending Epicurus’ views, Lucretius famously 
gives  an  additional  argument  for  why  we  need  not  fear  death.  According  to 
Lucretius, our condition after we are dead is identical with our condition before 
we were born, and since the time before we were born was not bad for us, then 
neither can the time after we die be bad. 
De Rerum Natura was highly regarded by Cicero, Ovid, and Virgil, and as 
a result of reading Lucretius’ work, Virgil was an Epicurean in his youth. Later in 
life, however, he abandoned hedonism, and wrote the famous Aeneid as a critical 
response to De Rerum Natura.
31 Another criticism of hedonism can be found in 
Plutarch’s  Against  Colotes,  Epicurus’  Disciple  and  Favorite,  where  Plutarch 
attacks Epicurus for holding that rather than devoting one’s life to public affairs, 
one should withdraw from the feuds of social life and live in peace and tranquility 
with a group of select friends. Such a life, Plutarch argues, is not a virtuous life. 
Cicero presents a related criticism in De Finibus, which is a detailed discussion of 
the problem of what is ultimately valuable. The first two books of De Finibus deal 
with hedonism, and Cicero argues that no version of hedonism is compatible with 
human dignity. Men who fight for their country, Cicero claims, fight not because 
this  brings  them  pleasure,  but  because  of  virtue,  and  though  such  fights  are 
obviously noble, hedonism cannot account for its nobility.
32 
As Christianity became the dominant intellectual force in the Roman 
Empire, criticisms of hedonism changed. Ambrose of Milan said the following to 
the Christian congregation in Vercelli in 396: 
 
it is certain then that Adam, being deceived by the desire of 
pleasure, fell away from the commandment of God and from the 
enjoyment of grace. How then can pleasure recall us to paradise, 
seeing that it alone deprived us of it?
33  
 
In addition to being theologically founded, the attacks on hedonism also became 
less sober. Clement of Alexandria writes in  Stromateis that Epicurus advocated 
simple gratification of all bodily desires; St. Jerome claimed that Lucretius was 
mad, and that every day, he ate until he threw up.
34 Arnobius wrote that if things 
are ‘as is laid down in the doctrine of Epicurus … it is not only a very great 
mistake, but shows stupid blindness, to curb innate desires, to restrict your mode 
of  life  within  narrow  limits,  not  yield  to  your  inclinations,  and  do  what  your 
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51–52. 
32 Cicero, I.IX. 
33 Ambrose of Milan, ‘Letter to Theodosius (LXIII)’, Letters, James Parker & Co, Oxford , 1881, 
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passions have demanded and urged...’
35 The smearing of Epicurus is striking, and 
as  Howard  Jones  writes,  the  Epicureans  were  accused  of  ‘swinish  gluttony, 
drunkenness, fornication, adultery, homosexuality, sodomy, incest – Theophilus, 
Clement, Pseudo-Clement, Ambrose, Epiphanius, Peter Chrysologus, Filastrius, 
and Augustine each contributing a little to the list.’
36 
It is worth noting, however, that Augustine had a more interesting view on 
Epicurean hedonism than do the rest of the church fathers. In his Confessions, 
Augustine writes: 
 
And  I  discussed  with  my  friends,  Alypius  and  Nebridius,  the 
nature  of  good  and  evil,  maintaining  that,  in  my  judgment, 
Epicurus would have carried off the palm [i.e. been right] if I had 
not believed what Epicurus would not believe: that after death 
there remains a life for the soul, and places of recompense. And I 
demanded  of  them:  ‘Suppose  we  are  immortal  and  live  in  the 
enjoyment of perpetual bodily pleasure, and that without any fear 
of losing it—why, then, should we not be happy, or why should 
we search for anything else?’
 37 
 
In a letter to archbishop Nectarius of Constantinople he writes: 
 
[contrary  to  the]  opinion  of  the  Epicureans  …  the  soul  is  not 
annihilated,  but  removes  from  its  tenement,  and  continues  in 
existence for a state of blessedness or misery, according to that 
which a man's actions, whether good or bad, claim as their due 
recompense.
38 
 
The  reason  this  is  interesting  is  that  it  hardly  contradicts  hedonism.  First, 
Augustine concedes that if there is no god who punishes us in the afterlife, 
hedonism is correct. Here Augustine and Epicurus agree. Second, Augustine 
claims that depending on how we act in this life, we will get a blessed or a 
miserable afterlife. This, at least on one interpretation, is as much a reaffirmation 
as it is a denial of hedonism, for the difference between Augustine and Epicurus 
appears not to be their ethical views, but their views on what happens when we 
die. If Epicurus had been convinced that such  horrors as eternal hellfire await us 
after  death,  we  have  little  reason  to  believe  that  he  would  take  issue  with 
Augustine’s recommendations. If it is the suffering of hell we should act to avoid, 
and the joys of heaven we should act to secure, this is hedonism as good as any. 
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Hedonism  was  not  discussed  extensively  after  Augustine,  and  when 
Justinian forced the philosophical schools of Athens to close in 529 AD, he closed 
Epicurus’ school after more than 700 years of continual activity. Thomas Aquinas 
does not seem to have been familiar with Epicurus, and does not discuss him in 
Summa Theologiae. He does, however, discuss Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure in 
Nicomachean Ethics, and concludes that pleasures can be good, but that they gain 
their goodness, not simply by virtue of being pleasures, but by virtue of indicating 
that one acts in a way that realises one’s nature.
39 Dante, on the other hand, was 
aware of Epicurus, and his treatment of Epicurus in the Divine Comedy was harsh: 
While  he  placed  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle  in  the  outer  circle  of  Hell,  in 
Limbo, he placed Epicurus in a burning tomb in the sixth circle.
40 
 
 
6.  Renaissance and Early Modern Hedonism 
As the Middle Ages came to an end, hedonistic ideas became subject to more 
scholarly attention. In 1400 Francisco Zabarella published De Felicitate, in which 
he  discusses  Epicurus’  hedonism.  Although  Zabarella  criticises  Epicurus  for 
holding  that  pleasure  is  the  supreme  good,  he  praises  him  for  putting  more 
emphasis on mental than bodily pleasures.
41 Poggio Bracciolini, who was one of 
the major collectors of Greek and Latin manuscripts, rediscovered and published 
Lucretius’  De  Rerum  Natura  in  1471.  Initially,  Poggio  is  said  to  have  been 
persuaded by Lucretius’ hedonism, but he came to abandon these ideas later on. 
Fourteen years after the rediscovery of De Rerum Natura, Lorenzo Valla wrote 
De  Voluptate  (On  Pleasure),  where  he  let  the  spokesman  ‘Vegio’  defend 
Epicurean hedonism. Since Valla laid out the view convincingly, Poggio accused 
him of being a hedonist – at the time, a very serious accusation. In 1473 Cicero’s 
De Finibus, which contains a detailed discussion of hedonism, was rediscovered, 
and in 1533 Epicurus’ letter to Menoeceus was published. With the invention of 
the printing press, these works were quickly spread, and they were widely read. 
Michel de Montaigne’s Essays contains more than one hundred quotes from De 
Rerum Natura.
42 
Hedonism remained unpopular, however, especially among theologians. 
Philip Melanchton, in  Philosophiae Moralis Epitomes, agreed with Poggio that 
Valla was probably guilty of being a hedonist. Martin Luther, in the tradition of 
the Church Fathers,  interpreted Epicurus  as  advocating surrender to  all bodily 
lusts, and used ‘Epicureanism’ repeatedly as a derogatory term.
43 In his famous 
letter exchange with Erasmus, Luther accuses Erasmus of giving in to ‘Epicurus’ 
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drunkenness.’
44  More  interesting  than  Luther’s  misrepresentation  of  Epicurus’ 
views  is  the  way  Erasmus  responds.  Erasmus  responds,  in  the  dialogue 
‘Epicurus’, not by denying that he has hedonistic sympathies, but by presenting 
Epicurean hedonism as more enlightened and wise than Luther had assumed. One 
of the characters in the dialogue, named ‘Hedonius’, analyzes Epicurus’ theory 
and explains that Epicurus does not advocate ‘shameless love, unlawful lust,’ for 
this  brings  only  ‘the  ague,  the  headache,  the  grips,  dullness  of  wit,  disgrace, 
forgetfulness, vomiting, gastric ulcers, and the tremors.’
45 Although Hedonius’ list 
is different from Epicurus’, it brings to the discussion one of the central points in 
Epicurus’ ethics. 
The first decisively modern hedonist was Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi was 
an Epicurean, and in 1647, in De Vita et Mobrus Epicuri, he defended Epicurus 
against a line of accusations. Two years later, building on the writings of Cicero, 
Diogenes,  Plutarch,  and  Lucretius,  among  others,  Gassendi  gave  a  systematic 
presentation of Epicurus’ thought in Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma.  
While Aristippus and Epicurus were ethical egoists, Gassendi’s variant of 
hedonism  was  universalistic.  Gassendi  was  a  Christian,  and  God  plays  an 
important  role  in  the  universalization.  By  creating  Heaven  and  Hell,  God  has 
made  sure  that,  ultimately,  there  is  no  conflict  between  self-interest  and  the 
greater good, because good deeds are rewarded and bad deeds are punished. God 
has also made us empathetic, so that we care for others’ well-being, and more 
generally, he has made pleasurable the things that bring us health and painful the 
things that harm us. Pleasure and pain, in Gassendi’s view, are instruments of 
God. 
Gassendi had an enormous impact on the French Enlightenment. Samuel 
Sorbière, Jean François Sarasin, and François Bernier learned of Epicurus through 
Gassendi, and several of the central French philosophers in the 17th and 18th 
centuries—such  as  Helvetius,  La  Mettrie,  Holbach,  and  Condorcet—were 
hedonists. Though they rejected Gassendi’s theism, however, they stuck to his 
universalistic variant of the doctrine. To a large extent due to Gassendi, hedonism 
became a leading theory in late 17
th and early to mid 18
th century French thought. 
Through Gassendi, hedonism also came to play a central role in British 
philosophy. In 1654 Walter Charleton translated into English the ethics section of 
Gassendi’s Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma, and published it as Epicurus’ Morals. 
Later the same year he published a paraphrase of the Syntagma under the title 
Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletonia. 
John  Locke  came  to  know  of  Epicurus  and  Gassendi  partly  through 
Charleton, partly through Robert Boyle, who was impressed by Gassendi and who 
became  an  acquaintance  of  Locke  when  they  both  lived  in  Oxford.
46  Locke, 
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moreover,  moved  to  France  in  1675,  where  he  met  several  of  Gassendi’s 
followers  (Gassendi  himself  had  passed  away  in  1655).  According  to  Edward 
Driscoll, we can then observe a shift in Locke’s thought away from the view that 
the good is adherence to God’s laws toward the view that the good is pleasure.
47 
A decade later, in  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Locke 
writes: 
 
Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or 
Pain. That which we call Good, which is apt to cause or increase 
Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve 
us the possession of any other Good, or absence of any Evil. And 
on the contrary we name that Evil, which is apt to produce or 
increase  any  Pain,  or  diminish  any  Pleasure  in  us;  or  else 
procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good.
48 
 
In Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz describes Locke as a defender of Gassendi.
49 This is 
understandable, for Locke adopts Gassendi’s hedonism with few or no revisions. 
Locke also  gives God a similar role:  it  is  God,  Locke claims, who has made 
pleasure good and pain bad, and who continually makes sure that self-interest and 
the greater good are in harmony.
50 
Other British empiricists also held views that were close to hedonism. In 
Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, Thomas Hobbes, who 
was a friend of Charleton’s, writes the following: 
 
Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is 
delight  to  himself,  good;  and  that  evil  which  displeaseth  him: 
insomuch  that  while  every  man  differeth  from  another  in 
constitution,  they  differ  also  from  one  another  concerning  the 
common distinction of good and evil.  … And as we call good 
and evil the things that please and displease; so we call goodness 
and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it.
51 
 
In Scotland, Francis Hutcheson writes, in Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of 
Beauty and Virtue, that: 
 
The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of anykind, gives us our 
first  Idea  of  natural  Good,  or  Happiness;  and  then  all  objects 
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which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call’d immediately Good. 
... our sense of Pleasure is antecedent to advantage or Interest, and 
is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in objects, 
because  it  is  our  Interest  to  do  so;  but  objects  or  actions  are 
advantageous,  and  are  pursu’d  or  undertaken  from  Interest, 
because  we  receive  Pleasure  from  them.  Our  perception  of 
Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is advantageous or naturally 
Good  to  us,  but  what  is  apt  to  raise  Pleasure  mediately,  or 
immediately.
52 
 
David Hume, who was greatly influenced by Hutcheson, argues as follows in 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: 
 
Ask  a  man  why  he  uses  exercise;  he  will  answer,  because  he 
desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires 
health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you 
push  your  enquiries  farther,  and  desire  a  reason  why  he  hates 
pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate 
end, and is never referred to any other object. 
Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he 
may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling. 
If  you  ask,  why  he  is  anxious  on  that  head,  he  will  answer, 
because he desires to get money. If you demand Why? It is the 
instrument of pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity 
to ask for a reason.
53 
In  1731,  John  Gay  presents  a  novel  argument  for  hedonism  in  Preliminary 
Dissertation concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality. Gay 
attacks  what  he  takes  to  be  hedonism’s  main  contender,  moral  sense  theory, 
according to which we have direct knowledge of a number of goods and evils. To 
attack moral sense theory, he starts out by considering the mindsets of people who 
mistakenly have come to believe that money is good as an end in itself. He asks: 
 
Did not they at first perceive a great many Advantages from being 
posess’d  of  Money,  and  from  thence  conceive  a  Pleasure  in 
having it, thence desire it, thence endeavor to obtain it, thence 
receive  an  actual  Pleasure  in  obtaining  it,  thence  desire  to 
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preserve the Possession of it?
54  
 
Gay’s point is that people who value money as an end in itself have started out by 
valuing it only as a means, but having done so again and again, have gotten used 
to the idea that money is very valuable and have stared valuing it also as an end. 
The same associative mechanism, Gay  suggests, operates when people believe 
that  things  such  as  ‘Knowledge,  Fame  &  the  delight  in  Reading,  Building, 
Planting, and most of the various Exercises of Life’ are not only means toward 
pleasure, but are also ends in themselves.
55 What we do in such cases, he explains, 
is that ‘we annex Pleasure or Pain to certain Things or Actions.’
56 This way Gay 
sketches a way to defend hedonism by virtue of debunking competing theories. 
Finally, hedonism found an admirer in Thomas Jefferson. We know that 
Jefferson owned five copies of De Rerum Naturae,
57 and John Quincy Adams 
reported the following after a dinner with Jefferson: 
 
Mr. Jefferson said that the Epicurean philosophy came nearest to 
the truth, in his opinion, of any ancient system of philosophy. He 
wished the work of Gassendi concerning it had been translated. It 
was the only accurate account of it extant. I mentioned Lucretius. 
He said that was only a part—only the natural philosophy. But 
the moral philosophy was only to be found in Gassendi.
58 
 
In a letter to William Short, Jefferson himself wrote the following: 
 
As you say of yourself, I too am an Epicurean. I consider the 
genuine (not the imputed) doctrines of Epicurus as containing 
everything rational in moral philosophy which Greece and Rome 
have left us. … I take the liberty of observing that you [William 
Short] are not a true disciple of our master Epicurus, in indulging 
the  indolence  to  which  you  say  you  are  yielding.  One  of  his 
canons,  you  know,  was  that  ‘the  indulgence  which  prevents  a 
greater pleasure, or produces a greater pain, is to be avoided’
59 
 
Jefferson’s Epicurean sympathies might be useful to keep in mind when reading 
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about ‘the pursuit of happiness’ in the U.S. Declaration of Independence. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
Arguably, hedonism had its heyday with the spread of utilitarianism in the 19
th 
Century,  with  Jeremy  Bentham,  John  Mill,  and  Henry  Sidgwick.  This  better-
known part of the history of hedonism lies beyond the scope of this paper. Here 
my aim has been to show that hedonism was an important philosophical theory 
also prior to Bentham – both as a theory that was positively advanced and as a 
theory in contrast to which other value theories (including Plato’s and Aristotle’s) 
were presented. 
  Considering hedonism’s overall role in the history of philosophy, a topic 
particularly  worthy  of  attention  is  hedonism’s  close  ties  to  materialism  and 
empiricism.  These  links  make  sense  historically,  for  Democritus,  Epicurus, 
Lucretius, and Gassendi, in addition to being hedonists, were arguably the four 
most central figures in the early development of materialism and empiricism. The 
ties also makes sense philosophically, however, since if all that exists is matter 
and if all our knowledge must be derived from sense experience—in Humean 
terms, if all ideas must be derived from impressions—then where, if not from our 
experiences of pleasure and pain, could our ideas of good and bad possibly come? 
  Though this paper provides only a sketch of hedonism’s early history, I 
hope to have made a strong case that the fringe role that hedonism has played in 
the 20
th Century was an anomaly. Throughout most of the history of philosophy, 
hedonism has been one of the most influential value theories on offer. 
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